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1. Introduction
The chequered history of Digital Rights Management has left the technology with a
significant public relations problem. Users have become distrustful of it, and for good
reason.  At  its  heart,  however,  Digital  Rights  Management  (hereinafter  “DRM”)  is
simply a set of value-neutral technical approaches to protecting copyright, something
most  would  not  argue  against.  At  some  point,  however,  the  application  of  the
technology went beyond this core purpose, not just in protecting the rights of owners
beyond what copyright law mandates,1 but also by infringing the fundamental rights
of users, most notoriously the right to privacy and to protection of personal data as
enshrined  by  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights2 and  the  Charter  of
Fundamental Rights.3
Given this background and the damaged reputation of DRM, how can it be recast to
meet the aims for which it was originally designed, whilst simultaneously upholding
individuals' privacy rights in a digital era when fresh attacks on them come to light on
almost  a  daily basis?  And how can DRM fit  with  the  requirement for  privacy by
design in the soon to be enacted General Data Protection Regulation?4 
European  institutions  have  highlighted  a  desire  for  market-driven  approaches  to
privacy by design which can respond to the changing technological and economic
landscape,  while  maintaining  a  base  level  of  protection  for  European  citizens'
fundamental rights.5 This paper suggests a novel approach that integrates software
and  legal  process  modelling  in  order  to  facilitate  efficient,  low-cost  regulatory
compliance whilst  simultaneously upholding the user-oriented goals of  privacy by
1 For  more  on  the  problem  of  DRM  “over-reaching”  see  J.E.  Cohen,  ‘A  Right  to  Read
Anonymously: A Closer Look at Copyright Management in Cyberspace’ (1995) 28  Conn. L.
Rev. 981.
2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) (“ECHR”),
Art.  8.  The  focus  in  this  paper  is  on  European law,  although  of  course  privacy  and  data
protection considerations reach far beyond European borders.
3 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000), Arts. 7 and 8.
4 Regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data (hereinafter the “draft GDPR”), Art. 23. For the most recent
draft  text  see  “General  Data  Protection  Regulation  –  Preparation  of  a  General  Approach”
(European Council 9565/15, Brussels, 11 June 2015) – subsequent references are to this latest
text. The Regulation will come into force two years after the text is agreed (Art. 91), which is
expected to happen by the end of 2015.
5 See European Data Protection Supervisor, ‘EDPS Recommendations on the EU’s Options for
Data Protection Reform’ (2015) Opinion 3/2015, p. 8 and Amendment 27 of the Opinion of the
Committee on the Internal Market and  Consumer Protection on an earlier draft of the GDPR
(European Parliament A7-0402/2013).
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design. The approach has the potential  to bridge the gap between the legal and
technical  professions  which  at  present  poses  a  significant  obstacle  to  practical
implementations of privacy by design that are able to balance the interests both of
enterprises and of users.
The paper begins by setting out the legal landscape of privacy and data protection
law, as well as the privacy by design provisions in the draft GDPR. It then considers
the  primary  DRM  approaches  and  the  ways  in  which  they  can  be  abused  to
undermine user privacy, before describing a notorious incident which demonstrates
the significant  social  and commercial  impact  that  can result  from its  abuse,  and
therefore why rightholders and DRM producers have an interest in adapting their
systems  to  be  regulatorily  compliant.  Thereafter,  the  discussion  sets  out  the
foundations of the novel approach and considers its suitability for privacy by design
implementation under the draft GDPR regime, before concluding.
2. The legal context
2.1 Privacy and data protection law
Data protection as a concept can be traced back to the quest to assert and protect
fundamental human rights in the aftermath of the second world war. In 1950 the right
to privacy, from which data protection flows, was enshrined by Article 8 of the ECHR.
In 1968, at the UN International Conference on Human Rights in Tehran, concerns
were  raised  about  the  ways  in  which  the  fundamental  right  to  privacy might  be
impacted by newly emerging technologies for recording information – this was the
first discussion of data protection on the international stage.6 The first domestic data
protection legislation was enacted in the German state of Hesse in 1970, followed by
Sweden  in  1973.7 In  1980,  having  identifying  the  potential  economic  value  of
personal data, the Council of the OECD published guidelines8 aimed at striking a
balance between the commercial  interest  in  exploiting personal  data on the one
hand, and users' privacy rights on the other, noting that the latter had the potential to
“cause serious disruption in important sectors of the economy”.9 The guidelines were
6 F.H.  Cate,  ‘EU Data Protection Directive,  Information Privacy,  and the Public  Interest,  The’
(1994) 80 Iowa L. Rev. 431 at p. 431; G.G. Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection
as a Fundamental Right of the EU (Springer Science & Business, 2014), p. 40.
7 Cate (fn 6), p. 431.
8 ‘Guidelines on the Protection of  Privacy and Transborder Flows of  Personal  Data’ (OECD,
1980).
9 Ibid., preface.
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the  first  to  set  out  eight  data  protection  principles  of  (i)  collection  limitation (the
collection of personal data should be limited, fair and lawful, and should take place
with the knowledge and consent of the data subject), (ii) data quality (data gathered
should be relevant  to  the purpose(s)  for  which they will  be used and should be
accurate, complete and kept up-to-date), (iii) purpose specification (the purpose of
the  data  collection  should  be  specified,  and  further  unspecified  uses,  or  uses
incompatible  with  the  original  purposes,  are  prohibited  without  notice),  (iv)  use
limitation (changes to processing purposes require the consent of the data subject
unless legally mandated), (v) security (personal data should be reasonably secured
against loss and unauthorised access),  (vi)  openness (data controllers should be
open about their identity and location as well as their practices and policies regarding
personal data), (vii) individual participation (data subjects should be able to view, and
have erased, rectified, completed or changed information held about them), and (viii)
accountability  (data  controllers  must  comply  with  measures  implementing  the
principles and are accountable for failures to do so).
These  principles  have  been  formulated  in  various  ways  across  subsequent
instruments, but their essence runs throughout. They appear in the 1981 Council of
Europe  Convention  on  personal  data10 and  the  1995  DPD.11 Since  the  DPD’s
enactment the principles have appeared in an ISO standard12 and, of course, the
draft GDPR.13 At the core of each of these instruments is the concept of personal
data, meaning data which identify (or are capable of identifying14) a natural person.15
This crucial threshold can play an important part in implementing privacy by design,
as we shall see below.
2.2 Privacy by design
The concept  of  privacy by design (hereinafter “PbD”) dates from around the late
10 Council  of  Europe  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Individuals  with  regard  to  Automatic
Processing of Personal Data (1981), Arts. 5-8.
11 DPD Arts. 6-8.
12 ‘ISO/IEC 29100:2011 -  Information Technology -  Security  Techniques -  Privacy Framework’
(ISO/IEC, 2011) BS ISO/IEC 29100:2011.
13 Draft GDPR, Arts. 5-10.
14 In Europe, at least, under DPD Art. 2(a) (cf. the United States where identifiability is much less
strongly  regulated.  For  a  discussion  of  this  point  see  P.M.  Schwartz  and  D.J.  Solove,
‘Reconciling  Personal  Information  in  the  United  States  and  European  Union’  (2014)  102
California Law Review 877.
15 1981  Convention  Art.  2(a);  DPD  Art.  2(a);  draft  GDPR  Art.  4(1);  ‘ISO/IEC  29100:2011  -
Information Technology - Security Techniques - Privacy Framework’ (fn 12), para. 2.8.
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1990s. It  first gained prominence in Canada through the work of Ontario's former
Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ann Cavoukian.16 The first mention in official
European literature appears in the Commission's 2010 Communication entitled “A
Digital Agenda for Europe”, which states tersely, and only in a footnote, that
“[PbD] means that privacy and data protection are embedded throughout the
entire  life  cycle  of  technologies,  from  the  early  design  stage  to  their
deployment, use and ultimate disposal.”17
This  definition  was  repeated  verbatim,  again  in  a  footnote,  in  another  2010
Commission Communication entitled “A comprehensive approach to personal data
protection in the European Union”.18 Two years later, the concept of PbD was more
fully articulated in  Article  23 of  the  draft  GDPR, where  it  is  referred  to  as “data
protection by design”.19 Having gone through significant amendment in the European
Parliament and Commission readings, Article 23(1) currently reads
“Having regard to available technology and the cost of implementation and
taking account of the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing
as well as the likelihood and severity of the risk for rights and freedoms of
individuals posed by the processing, the controllers shall implement technical
and  organisational  measures  appropriate  to  the  processing  activity  being
carried  out  and  its  objectives,  such  as  data  minimisation  and
pseudonymisation,  in  such  a  way  that  the  processing  will  meet  the
requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects.”
Recital  61 uses similar  language,  suggesting  that  PbD measures “could”  involve
(inter alia) minimisation of processing, pseudonymisation and transparency. It states
also that
16 A. Cavoukian,  ‘Privacy by Design: Origins, Meaning, and Prospects for Assuring Privacy and
Trust  in  the Information Era’ in  George OM Yee (ed)  at  Privacy  Protection  Measures and
Technologies in Business Organizations: Aspects and Standards: Aspects and Standards (IGI
Global, 2012).
17 European Commission, ‘A Digital Agenda for Europe’ (2010) COM/2010/0245 final, note 21.
18 European  Commission,  ‘A  Comprehensive  Approach  on  Personal  Data  Protection  in  the
European Union’ (2010) COM(2010) 609 final, note 30.
19 The  two  terms  are  treated  as  synonymous  in  the  remained  of  this  paper;  for  brevity  the
acronym “PbD” be used.
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“...producers  of  the  products,  services  and  applications  [which  process
personal data] should be encouraged to take into account the right to data
protection when developing and designing [them] and, with due regard to the
state of the art, to make sure that controllers and processors are able to fulfil
their data protection obligations.”
The mention of pseudonymisation and data minimisation in Article 23(1) is welcome,
and provides a suggestion on where to begin with technical implementations of PbD
which  was  absent  in  the  previous  drafts.20 Nevertheless  there  is  little  further
guidance on how to achieve compliance under these provisions, leading to criticisms
that they are vague,21 that they “do not address technology producers [or] allow real
technology design”,22 and that they provide data controllers with “little clue on how
they should go about 'designing in' privacy”.23  
For the founding principles of PbD to be vague – Gürses et al note, for example, that
some of Cavoukian's original principles are recursive, that is their definition repeats
the  term,  as in  “Privacy by Design is  embedded into the  design”24 –  is  perhaps
understandable given the new ground they were breaking well over a decade ago. In
the present day, however, and especially in a Europe-wide legal instrument that is
binding verbatim and has significant  implications for  worldwide information flows,
such uncertainties are difficult to excuse.
As mentioned in the introduction, there is a desire to see the market-driven creation
of PbD solutions which can respond quickly to changes in technology and social
mores.25 But without practical guidance on what technical approaches will be legally-
20 See  for  example  Article  29  Data  Protection  Working  Party,  ‘Opinion  01/2012  on  the  Data
Protection Reform Proposals’ (2012) Opinion WP 191, p. 11 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2012/wp191_en.pdf>
accessed 4 July 2015.
21 S. Gürses, C. Troncoso and C. Diaz, ‘Engineering Privacy by Design’ (2011) 14  Computers,
Privacy  &  Data  Protection <https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-1542.pdf>
accessed 5 July 2015.
22 M. Pocs,  ‘Will  the European Commission Be Able to Standardise Legal Technology Design
without a Legal Method?’ (2012) 28 Computer Law & Security Review 641 at p. 644.
23 B.-J. Koops and R. Leenes, ‘Privacy Regulation Cannot Be Hardcoded. A Critical Comment on
the “privacy by Design” Provision in Data-Protection Law’ (2014) 28  International Review of
Law, Computers & Technology 159 at p. 162.
24 A.  Cavoukian  and  others,  ‘Privacy  by  Design:  The  7  Foundational  Principles’,  Principle  3
<https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2011/03/fred_carter.pdf> accessed 16 May 2015.
25 European Data Protection Supervisor (fn 5), p. 8.
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compliant the market is likely to respond by travelling the path of least resistance,
which is likely to undermine users' and, ultimately, enterprise interests. 
2.2.1 Risks arising from failure properly to implement PbD
The ambiguity surrounding PbD is problematic, particularly given the GDPR will have
direct  effect.  From an  economic  perspective,  innovation  is  chilled  as  only  those
enterprises with sufficient legal and financial resources to defend their actions will
have the confidence to  develop new products and services in  areas where data
protection and PbD law operate. The smaller, dynamic innovators who are often the
source of important technological breakthroughs are likely to be discouraged by the
prospect of legal action, financial  penalties and adverse publicity that might arise
should  they  misinterpret  the  ill-defined  PbD  provisions  or  inadvertently  fail  to
implement them in their designs.26 Alternatively, they may decide to take the risk and
ignore the requirement for PbD, especially in the initial stages when its meaning is
fluid and under interpretation (a precedent for this is the infamous EU “Cookie law”,27
which has been significantly defanged by domestic data protection authorities owing
to both its ambiguity and impracticality28). Such an eventuality may be commercially
attractive because the need to observe regulatory requirements is reduced, but it
would make a mockery of Article 23 by undermining the very rights it is intended to
protect.
Bearing in mind the conflicts inherent in a market where the enterprises creating the
software that will be required to embody PbD goals are often the same enterprises
which stand to gain from gathering personal data, there is a potentially concomitant
effect arising from the centralisation of PbD innovation around those companies. In
the absence of real competition between PbD approaches, and with the potential for
a cartel-like closing of ranks amongst the embedded players, we may be left with
token  gestures  towards  PbD  rather  than  concrete  implementations  that  are
demonstrably effective in upholding users’ rights.29 
26 The draft GDPR proposes penalties of up to €1m, or 2% of worldwide turnover, for breaches of
the Art. 23 PbD requirements. See Art. 79(6).
27 Directive Concerning the Processing of  Personal Data and the Protection of  Privacy in the
Electronic Communications Sector (the ePrivacy Directive) 2002/58/EC 2002, Art. 5.
28 The  UK Information  Commissioner’s  Office,  for  example,  now assesses  only  the  top  200
websites in that jurisdiction, and even then only quarterly. See <https://ico.org.uk/action-weve-
taken/cookies/> (accessed 15 August 2015).
29 Gürses, Troncoso and Diaz (fn 22), part 4.2.
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Further  below  I  discuss  what  the  overarching  concerns  are  of  those  aiming  to
implement privacy-friendly systems. The difficulty of PbD's ill-defined characteristics
and the lack of concrete guidance can to an extent be sidestepped by shifting our
focus  away  from  post  hoc compliance  with  new  and  untested  regulatory  ideas
towards the application of what are well-established data protection values at a stage
early enough in the design process that those values are, de facto, “designed in”.
This is the basis of the novel approach presented by this paper. Before moving onto
that discussion, I will first set out the landscape of DRM technology and how it can
and has been used to undermine privacy.
3. DRM: a much-maligned technology
DRM refers to a range of technological approaches designed to protect rightholders'
interests  with  regard  to  the  unlicensed copying  and  distribution  of  their  licensed
works.30 To that  extent,  DRM technologies are a perfectly legitimate  and rational
response to behaviour which threatens those interests.  That behaviour has been
radically enabled by the move towards mass digitisation of media content, where the
creation of identical copies is trivial, fast and virtually costless. In spite of this, certain
DRM  implementations  have  gone  beyond  protecting  rightholders'  interests,
extending  the  core  copyright  reservations  beyond  their  normative  scope  and
breaching user privacy in the process.
3.1 Approaches used in DRM systems
The  aims  of  DRM  are  to  control  access  to  licensed  works,  prevent  or  limit
unauthorised  use  of  those  works,  identify  the  works,  the  rightholder  and  the
authorised licensee, and to protect that information from tampering, corruption or the
possibility of forging.31 Individual DRM systems may prioritise and fulfil these aims
differently  according  to  commercial  imperative,  the  medium  on  which  they  are
intended  to  be  used,  limitations  in  the  state-of-the-art  or  a  lack  of
expertise/willingness on the part of the DRM vendor.
30 See Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of  copyright and related
rights in the information society, Recitals 25 and 28 and Arts. 2–4.
31 L.A. Bygrave, ‘Digital Rights Management and Privacy – Legal Aspects in the European Union’
in Eberhard Becker, Willms Buhse and Dirk Günnewig (eds) at  Digital Rights Management -
Technological, Economic, Legal and Political Aspects (Springer, 2003), p. 420; on forgeability,
see J.A. Halderman and E.W. Felten, ‘Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode.’ [2006] 15th
USENIX Security Symposium 77, pp. 9–10.
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There are four primary DRM strategies rightholders can employ to protect content,
although they are not mutually exclusive – a given DRM system can employ more
than one simultaneously.32 Classified broadly from the least  to  the most  privacy-
invasive, the approaches are as follows:
3.1.1 Encryption and metadata (file-side DRM)33
This approach involves encrypting the contents of  the file  so that only approved
software can decrypt it. The file may also include metadata that defines the ways in
which a particular licensee is authorised to use the file – in such cases the DRM is
said to control both access and use.34 This approach is portable – the DRM in its
entirety travels with the file and operates in a fairly passive manner such that if the
holder of the file has the requisite software and/or decryption key then she will be
able to access the file regardless of how she obtained them. In terms of privacy, this
basic form of DRM is fairly benign – it is not designed to check who a given user is
and a fortiori provides no mechanism for identification or behavioural tracking.
3.1.2 Associating files with the device or user (relationship-based DRM)
The “node locking” approach associates the file with a particular device, and involves
generating a unique fingerprint from that device. The DRM algorithm can prevent
access if it finds that the fingerprint it generates differs from the one embedded in the
file.  This approach has implications for privacy – upon purchase the user will  be
identified via the association with their device, and any subsequent re-association
(for example if they wish to move the file to an upgraded device) will re-identify the
user  to  the  rightholder  and  confirm  that  she  is  still  interested  in  that  particular
content.35 
A more invasive approach involves identification of the user by authenticating them
on whichever device they are using. The DRM relationship is thus formed between
the rightholder and the individual, instead of between the rightholder and a particular
32 These classifications are borrowed in part from J. Feigenbaum and others, ‘Privacy Engineering
for Digital Rights Management Systems’ in Tomas Sander (ed) at Security and Privacy in Digital
Rights  Management (Springer  Berlin  Heidelberg,  2002),  pp.  79–81
<http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/3-540-47870-1_6> accessed 16 May 2015.
33 Sometimes  also  referred  to  as  the  “containment”  approach.  See  C.  Woodford,  ‘Trusted
Computing Or Big Brother - Putting the Rights Back in Digital Rights Management’ (2004) 75
University of Colorado Law Review 253, p. 274.
34 Ibid.
35 Feigenbaum and others (fn 34), p. 80.
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inanimate device which might be used by many people, or indeed no-one. The scope
for  privacy  invasion  is  accordingly  much  wider  as  real-time  authentication  by
definition  identifies  the  individual,  as  well  as  providing  behavioural  metadata  on
matters such as frequency and timing of use which can be aggregated to generate
new forms of data about the user that she will in most cases be wholly unaware of.36
3.1.3 Embedding restrictions in hardware (device-side DRM)
This  is  a  more  sophisticated  version  of  relationship-based  DRM,  and  involves
embedding deep within the hardware itself a framework of restrictions that prevents
the  use  of  files  in  the  absence  of  some  external  authorisation.  In  contrast  with
software-based DRM, these systems are built into not just core components of the
operating  system  but  also  the  physical  fabric  of  the  machine  itself,  making
circumvention  significantly  more  difficult37 but  also  forcing  users  to  accede  to
unprecedented  levels  of  use  authorisation  checking  and  control  over  their
machines.38
3.1.4 Providing access on-the-fly (server-side DRM)
The final DRM approach is fast becoming the norm39 as Internet connectivity speeds
improve to a point where the huge amounts of data storage required for high-quality
media can be transferred on-the-fly (“streamed”) to users with little or no waiting
times. Server-side DRM employs a combination of some the above methods – the
user will be authenticated with the service, her profile will be checked to identify what
media  she is  authorised to  access,  and the  data  stream itself  will  be  encrypted
during transfer and decryptable only by proprietary software on the user's device.
In terms of privacy this is perhaps the most invasive form of DRM. In such systems
the locus of control is very much within the server(s) providing the content, rather
than  the  user’s  own  machine.40 Access  is  entirely  contingent  on  the  rightholder
36 Cohen  (fn  1),  p.  7;  P.  Vora,  D.  Reynolds  and  I.  Dickinson,  ‘Privacy  and  Digital  Rights
Management’  at  A position  paper  for  the  W3C  workshop  on  Digital  Rights  Management
(Publishing  Systems  and  Solutions  Lab,  Hewlett-Packard  Laboratories,  2001),  pp.  2–3
<http://www.w3.org/2000/12/drm-ws/pp/hp-poorvi2.html> accessed 16 May 2015.
37 Woodford (fn 35), pp. 257 and 281.
38 R.  Anderson,  ‘Trusted  Computing  FAQ  v1.1’  (August  2003)
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html> accessed 15 June 2015 Question 2.
39 As recently as 2002 this approach was described as “radical”- see Feigenbaum and others (fn
34), p. 80.
40 cf. Spiekermann and Cranor’s suggestion that personal data processing should occur client-
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accepting the user's credentials. Beyond this, the chain of events required to access
protected  content  provides  an  unprecedented  opportunity  for  the  rightholder  to
undermine  user  privacy  through  the  gathering  of  detailed  data  about  the  user's
tastes and behavioural patterns.
3.2 The Sony BMG rootkit incident
This  section  discusses  a  particularly  infamous  incident  which  demonstrates  the
commercial  consequences  of  misjudging  how  to  deploy  the  technology.  In  the
Autumn of  2005  Sony BMG,  then  the  world’s  second  largest  record  company,41
included  on  several  of  its  CD  releases  “rootkit”42 software  designed  to  prevent
playback  and  “ripping”43 of  the  music  contained thereon by unauthorised  (in  the
technical, rather than normative, sense) applications on users’ Windows PCs. The
software installed itself surreptitiously on users’ machines and required the use of a
proprietary media application to listen to the CD, to convert its tracks to digital files
(which had to be in a DRM-protected format), or to create up to three copies of the
disc.44 This application would also check whether the computer was running other
CD-ripping software and would cease playback and eject the CD if such software
was  detected.45 As  with  many  other  forms  of  DRM  these  measures  appeared
superficially  reasonable  insofar  as  they  were  aimed  at  thwarting  copyright
infringement, however it soon became apparent that the software's behaviour had
serious implications for user privacy.
After investigating a tip-off from a commenter on his blog post about the Sony BMG
DRM software,  security  researcher  Mark  Russinovich  discovered  that  the  media
player software was connecting to Sony BMG’s servers to check for updated album
artwork, and in the process sending an ID of the CD being played along with the
side as far as possible, in order to avoid undermining privacy. See  S. Spiekermann and L.F.
Cranor,  ‘Engineering  Privacy’  (2009)  35  IEEE  Transactions  on  Software  Engineering 67
(discussed further below).
41 T.L. McPhail, Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders, and Trends (John Wiley & Sons,
2009), p. 131.
42 The term “rootkit”  refers  to  characteristics  of  the  software  which  seriously  undermined  the
security of the systems it was installed on. For a fuller description see Halderman and Felten (fn
32).
43 “Ripping” refers to the process of converting a CD’s audio tracks into digital music files to be
stored on another medium.
44 Halderman and Felten (fn 33), p. 14.
45 Ibid, p. 6.
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user’s  IP  address.46 In  a  comment  on  Russinovich’s  blog  a  user  purporting  to
represent the company which developed the software suggested that this “phoning
home” behaviour was designed purely to update an advertising banner in the media
player  software and that  “no information is  ever  fed back or  collected about  the
consumer or their activities”.47 This was disingenuous insofar as merely connecting
to Sony BMG’s servers, even for the innocent purpose of updating the advertising
banner,  necessarily fed information back: absent the user's employment of  some
technical measure to mask it, their IP address will  always be made known to the
server they are connecting to. Furthermore, the inclusion of the CD’s identifier and
metadata storing the time of the request meant that, however minimal it might be
argued the communication was, and whatever it might (or might not) be used for, it
was nevertheless data which Sony BMG was being sent by the DRM software. This,
coupled with the lack of disclosure in the software's terms and conditions and the
absence of a viable uninstaller for the software meant it constituted what is known as
“spyware”48 – that is, “[s]oftware that surreptitiously gathers information and transmits
it to interested parties”.49
3.2.1 Commercial and public relations impact
The fall-out  from the Sony BMG rootkit  incident was significant.  Direct  economic
impacts came from a fall-off in the number of affected CDs being sold, the recall of
millions of affected discs (reportedly $6.5m to recall 4.7m50 of a total of around 25m
CDs51),  settlement  payouts  resulting  from  numerous  lawsuits,52 and  of  course
resulting loss of sales and the cost of a DRM system which could no longer be used.
From a public  relations  perspective  the  company's  reputation  was  battered,  with
users threatening to boycott both Sony BMG music and its parent company's range
46 Mark Russinovich, ‘More on Sony: Dangerous Decloaking Patch, EULAs and Phoning Home’
<http://blogs.technet.com/b/markrussinovich/archive/2005/11/04/more-on-sony-dangerous-
decloaking-patch-eulas-and-phoning-home.aspx> accessed 8 June 2015.
47 Available on the Internet Archive at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20051124225410/http://www.sysinternals.com/blog/2005/11/more-
on-sony-dangerous-decloaking.html#113115114916278358 (accessed 12 June 2015).
48 Halderman and Felten (fn 33), p. 14.
49 ‘Viruses,  Spyware,  and  Malware’  (MIT  Information  Systems  &  Technology)
<https://ist.mit.edu/security/malware> accessed 2 August 2015.
50 ‘Sony  BMG  Recalls  Copy  Protected  CDs’  (Billboard,  18  November  2005)
<http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/60609/sony-bmg-recalls-copy-protected-cds>
accessed 2 August 2015.
51 D.K. Mulligan and A. Perzanowski, ‘The Magnificence of the Disaster: Reconstructing the Sony
BMG Rootkit Incident’ (2007) 22 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1157, p. 1170.
52 In re SONY BMG CD Technologies Litigation settlement agreement [2005] New York Southern
District Court No 1:05-CV-09575,.
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of electronics53 and commentators poking fun at Sony BMG's mistake. As a result the
company became “inextricably associated with  its  misguided attempts at  content
protection”.54 
Of course, the particular point in history when the rootkit incident took place perhaps
served to maximise its impact. Broadband infrastructure was becoming ubiquitous,
and with it the notional threat of file sharing to rightholders' revenue streams. DRM
technology became sought after as a solution to this threat, and record labels and
their DRM software suppliers were under pressure to stem the perceived tidal wave
of piracy by whatever means necessary, sometimes (wittingly or unwittingly) cutting
corners  in  the  process.55 Added  to  this,  the  costs  inherent  in  the  manufacture,
distribution and recall of physical media will have had added to the impact. Despite
this, the incident demonstrates the fragility of an entrenched position (Sony BMG
was the world's second largest record label at the time of the incident 56) in a market
based on goodwill, where users' awareness of regulatory issues around privacy and
data protection is increasing.57 Indeed, the effects were not unique to Sony BMG.
Privacy  breaches  have  been  shown  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  stock  market
valuation,58 while regulatory fines have reached into the hundreds of thousands59 and
financial settlements into the tens of millions.60 
3.2.2 Legal analysis
From a European legal perspective the IP addresses collected by Sony BMG's DRM
software  directly  are  directly  identifying  and  thus  personal  data,61 bringing  them
53 Mulligan and Perzanowski (fn 53), p. 1171.
54 Ibid.
55 Halderman and Felten (fn 33), pp. 2–3.
56 Mulligan and Perzanowski (fn 53), p. 1158.
57 See for example the European Commission's March 2015 survey of 28,000 EU citizens: ‘Data
Protection  Eurobarometer’  (2015)  <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-
protection/news/240615_en.htm> accessed 31 July 2015.
58 A. Acquisti, A. Friedman and R. Telang, ‘Is There a Cost to Privacy Breaches? An Event Study’
[2006] ICIS 2006 Proceedings 94.
59 See  for  example  the  UK Information  Commissioner’s  Office,  ‘Enforcement’  (7  July  2015)
<https://ico.org.uk/action-weve-taken/enforcement/>  accessed  2  August  2015..  Under  the
GDPR the upper ceiling for monetary penalties is set to increase significantly; see Art. 79.
60 See  for  example  Federal  Communications  Commission,  ‘AT&T  To  Pay  $25M  To  Settle
Investigation Into Three Data Breaches’ (8 April 2015) <https://www.fcc.gov/document/att-pay-
25m-settle-investigation-three-data-breaches-0> accessed 2 August 2015.
61 See Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM [2011] EUECJ C-70/10, para. 51; Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues Related to Search Engines’ (2008)
WP 148, p. 8.
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within the regulatory auspices of the DPD62 and, prospectively, the draft GDPR.63 The
failure to inform their customers of the software's behaviour arguably fell foul of the
data  protection  principles'  requirements  of  fairness  and  transparency,  which  are
concerned with disclosure of the nature and extent of processing activities64 – under
the  DPD  data  subjects  must  be  “in  a  position  to  learn  of  the  existence  of  the
processing” and, more stringently under the draft GDPR, “informed of the existence
of the processing operation and its purposes”. The processing purposes were neither
specified nor explicit65 – the license agreement made no mention of the software
connecting to Sony BMG's servers, and in fact actively denied that it collected any
personal data whatsoever.66 
Furthermore, the data collected were excessive in relation to facilitating the DRM
mechanism67 which, as an example of simple file-side DRM (described above), did
not require the collection of personal data at all in order to operate. Setting aside the
other  problems their  system had  as  a  mechanism of  protecting  their  rights,  the
easiest way for Sony BMG to have avoided any data protection implications would
have  been  to  keep  the  underlying  DRM mechanism requiring  playback  on  their
proprietary software but  to  eschew the functionality that  communicated with  their
servers. If it was felt that this would be too great a reduction in functionality (that is,
the banner ads and up-to-date album artwork were deemed to important a part of the
product's selling point for them to be removed) then some other privacy enhancing
mechanism could be used to remove the system from the data protection regime, for
example anonymisation of users' IP addresses.
Perhaps the legal and technical options open to Sony BMG were unclear, or they
knew about them but felt the potential commercial dividends were worth the risk. The
novel approach discussed below aims to assist in clarifying such uncertainties, in
order that enterprises developing DRM systems can do so with confidence that their
62 Recital 26 and Art. 2(a).
63 Recitals 23 and 24; Art. 4(2). Note the caveat in Recital 24, however, that identifiers such as IP
addresses may not in every case constitute personal data.
64 DPD  Art.  6(1)(a)  and  Recital  38,  and  draft  GDPR  Art.  5(1)(a)  and  Recitals  30  and  48,
respectively.
65 DPD Art. 6(1)(b); draft GDPR Art. 5(1)(b).
66 A copy of the license agreement is available in the web archive at 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20051124012205/http://www.sysinternals.com/blog/sony-eula.htm>
(accessed 13 June 2015).
67 DPD Art. 6(1)(c); draft GDPR Art. 5(1)(c).
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software designs are legally-compliant. First I discuss the general range of concerns
which at present face enterprises who wish to design privacy-compliant software.
4. Perspectives on privacy compliance
The over-arching range of factors involved in designing privacy compliance into a
software system is complex. One might first think of consider the human-technical
spectrum, ranging from the “fuzzy” regulation of natural language-based policies and
agreements to the concreteness of regulation-by-code.68 Then one might consider
where on the spectrum of sophistication any given technical mechanism lies. Finally,
and  importantly  for  PbD,  there  is  what  might  be  termed  the  “design-runtime
spectrum”, which asks at what point in the development and release cycle of the
software system the regulatory mechanism is implemented – nearer the beginning
(design stage), or attached to the end product (runtime stage).
4.1 The human–technical spectrum
The two strands of Article 23 of the draft GDPR refer to the use of both technical and
organisational  (human)  measures.  Koops  and  Lennes  are  wary  of  too  great  an
emphasis  being  placed  on  the  former  and  consider  that,  due  to  the  problems
inherent in purely technology-based regulation,  it  will  be organisational  measures
that are better placed to meet the aims of PbD.69 Spiekermann and Cranor usefully
re-frame  the  two  ends  of  this  spectrum  as  “privacy-by-policy”  and  “privacy-by-
architecture”,70 whereby the former uses the traditional measures of privacy policies
and other basic notice and consent mechanisms to achieve notionally the aims of the
legislation – essentially, this represents the status quo. At the latter end the focus is
on designing software to gather less personal data, a goal which is empowered by
the approach suggested later in this paper.
At  present  businesses  favour  the  primarily  organisational,  privacy-by-policy
approach, because it can be applied easily to existing practises without impacting
heavily on core business activities (by, for example, adding privacy policies or simple
consent mechanisms). While this may have been sufficient in past years, it is now
sub-optimal for at least three reasons. Firstly, the temptation will be to undermine
68 See L. Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (Basic Books, 2006).
69 Koops and Leenes (fn 23).
70 Spiekermann and Cranor (fn 41).
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user privacy as technical systems remain “black boxes” from the user's perspective
and  because  of  the  inherent  “fuzziness”  of  regulations,  policies  and  contracts
expressed in natural language. Secondly, and as discussed above, as users become
more aware of privacy concerns in the online environment they will rightly expect
more explicit assurances as to how they are protected – anything less is likely to
result  in  a  chilling  effect  on  users'  economic  activity.71 Thirdly,  businesses which
focus  solely  on  privacy-by-policy at  the  expense of  privacy-by-architecture  divert
limited  development  resources away from development  of  the core product  onto
designing and implementing policies and consent measures. The content of those
policies might diverge from the actual technical behaviour of the system and/or the
nature of the consent may be insufficient or misinformed, inviting the risk of litigation
or censure from regulatory authorities if such deficiencies are found to exist.
Even if we accept the concerns about regulatory tools which rely solely on technical
measures,  those concerns do not mean we cannot be  assisted  by computerised
tools. The question is where the optimum point on the policy–architecture spectrum
lies, and crucially, how this will look and where it should be located within the design-
runtime spectrum, discussed below.
4.2 The technical sophistication spectrum
The technical approaches to implementing privacy within a software system have
differing levels of complexity, efficacy and expense. On the less sophisticated end of
the spectrum we have the most generic PET, encryption. Its strength is that it  is
technologically mature and simple to implement, but the drawback is that it is blunt in
its operation, with file/service access and the reciprocal provision of personal data
being all-or-nothing. This prevents fine-grained control, militating against a balancing
of the interests of the enterprise and the user.
At the opposite end of the spectrum there is the translation of regulatory norms into
representations which are directly comprehensible by artificial intelligence. With this
“hard-coding”,72 the machine can act directly on a digital “concept” which is directly
analogous to  its  real-world  counterpart.  The benefits  can be readily appreciated:
71 D. Chaum, ‘Security Without Identification: Transaction Systems to Make Big Brother Obsolete’
(1985) 28 Commun. ACM 1030.
72 Koops and Leenes (fn 23).
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computers  can  interpret  and  enforce  regulatory  norms  directly  and  with  near-
perfection, without the need for costly and time-consuming legal processes or human
interpretation. This is the apotheosis of Lessig’s concept of code-as-law.73 But rather
than, as in his thesis, code representing merely another separate regulatory modality
operating within the broader mix, hard-coding envisions it instead as subsuming the
very substance of the law, combining the already formidable power of regulation-by-
code  with  the  normative,  democratic  regulatory  force  of  physical-world  law.  The
result is, at least in theory, ideal – democratically legitimate legal norms enforced by
code that can regulate perfectly.74
While  these  benefits  are  notionally  attractive,  there  are  democratic  concerns
surrounding  the  use  of  autonomous  computer  agents  in  regulation.  Unlike  the
orthodox, human-centred regulatory framework, the development and enforcement
of  regulatory  norms  becomes  centralised  in  the  creator  of  the  technology,
sidestepping the separation of powers which traditionally acts as a check on the
abuse  of  power.75 Simultaneously,  the  perfection  of  code-based  regulation
encourages inflexibility and potentially authoritarianism as the role of humans in the
process  of  assessing,  adapting  and  enforcing  regulatory  norms  is  usurped.76 A
reliance by enterprise on the “ambient regulation”77 that hard-coding would introduce
would have the potential to discourage proper engagement and consideration of the
regulatory environment within which their products operate and the rights and values
which they have a bearing upon. This would likely result in commercially damaging
incidents like the Sony BMG case and the undermining of users' fundamental rights.
Note that hard-coding should not to be confused with less complex techniques which
aim to formalise the law into ontologies of legal artefact and relationship definitions
whose predefined rules a computer can apply.78 They lie closer to the middle of the
73 See generally  Lessig (fn 69). See also J.R. Reidenberg,  ‘Lex Informatica: The Formulation of
Information Policy Rules through Technology’ (1997) 76 Tex. L. Rev. 553. and J. Zittrain,  The
Future of the Internet and How to Stop It (Yale University Press, 2008), p. 107 et seq.
74 Perfect in the absolute sense rather than the normative sense. See Lessig (fn 70), preface.
75 K. Yeung,  ‘Towards an Understanding of Regulation by Design’ in Karen Yeung and Roger
Brownsword  (eds)  at  Regulating  technologies:  Legal  futures,  regulatory  frames  and
technological fixes (Hart, 2008), p. 94.
76 Lessig (fn 70), p. 135; R. Brownsword, ‘So What Does the World Need Now? Reflections on
Regulating  Technologies’  in  Karen  Yeung  and  Roger  Brownsword  (eds)  at  Regulating
technologies: Legal futures, regulatory frames and technological fixes (Hart, 2008). 
77 Yeung (fn 77), pp. 89–90.
78 R. Hoekstra and others, ‘The LKIF Core Ontology of Basic Legal Concepts’ (2007) 321 LOAIT
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spectrum:  the  computer  does  not  understand  the  normative  substance of  the
elements in the ontology, merely the logical relationships between them. Numerous
approaches  exist  to  distil  legal  provisions  into  pared-down  ontologies  that  are
susceptible to logical appraisal, for example the KORA (“Konkretisierung rechtlicher
Anforderungen” – concretisation of legal requirements) method,79 Breaux et al’s work
on semantic representation of legal norms80 or Oberle et al’s particularly relevant
work  on formalisation  and automated  legal  reasoning.81 From the perspective  of
those  designing  software  systems,  however,  these  approaches require  a
combination of legal and technical knowledge that only very few systems designers
have, decreasing the likelihood that enterprises will  embrace them.82 Later in the
discussion of the proposed approach we will see how this problem can be solved by
allowing experts in each field to concentrate on what they do best – lawyers focus on
the law; software designers focus on the software.  The approach is designed to
bridge the current gap between those two islands of expertise and make it as easy
as possible for enterprises to design software systems which are legally compliant
but without the need for significant investment in legal services or regulatory training.
4.3 Shifting the focus from runtime to design
Whereas there are numerous privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) available “off-
the-shelf” which can be grafted onto a software system once it has been designed,
these are not PbD in the true sense: privacy is not a value represented in the design
of  the  software  if  it  is  considered  as  an  adjunct  only  once  the  design  and/or
development of the core functionality has been completed. As Hoepman points out,
43.
79 V.  Hammer,  U.  Pordesch  and  A.  Roßnagel,  ‘KORA –  Eine  Methode  Zur  Konkretisierung
Rechtlicher  Anforderungen  Zu  Technischen  Gestaltungsvorschlägen  Für  Informations-Und
Kommunikationssysteme’ (1993)  21  Infotech/I+  G. (in  German.  For  a  useful  discussion  of
KORA in English, see  A. Hoffmann and others, ‘Towards the Use of  Software Requirement
Patterns for Legal Requirements’ (Social Science Research Network, 2012) SSRN Scholarly
Paper ID 2484455, p. 5  et seq. <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2484455> accessed 5 July
2015)
80 T.D. Breaux and others, ‘Towards Regulatory Compliance: Extracting Rights and Obligations to
Align Requirements with Regulations’ at  Requirements Engineering, 14th IEEE International
Conference (IEEE,  2006)  <http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=1704048>
accessed 20 July 2015.
81 D. Oberle and others,  ‘Engineering Compliant Software: Advising Developers by Automating
Legal Reasoning’ (2012) 9 SCRIPTed 280.
82 P.N. Otto  and A.I.  Anton,  ‘Addressing Legal  Requirements in Requirements Engineering’ at
Requirements Engineering Conference, 2007. RE ’07. 15th IEEE International (2007).
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“[d]uring software development the availability of practical methods to protect
privacy  is  high  during  actual  implementation,  but  low  when  starting  the
project...  at  the  start  of  the  project,  during  the  concept  development  and
analysis phases, the developer stands basically empty handed.”83
Hafiz  provides  a  useful  taxonomy of  software  techniques  for  protecting  privacy,
which he terms “privacy design patterns”.84 Hoepman extends the idea of privacy
design  patterns  into  “privacy  design  strategies”,  abstracted  from  the  privacy
principles  contained  in  the  OECD  Guidelines,85 the  DPD,  and  the  relevant  ISO
standard,86 which can be matched up with the privacy design pattern(s) best suited
to implementing them.87  
4.3.1 Reconceptualising “by design”
As discussed above,  an  ideal  PbD solution  should  balance the  extremes of  the
policy-architecture spectrum, take account of cost and the state-of-the-art, and be
sited at the point in the software development cycle where privacy values can be
reflected most efficiently and economically in the design. These various approaches
are useful in terms of identifying the appropriate technical mechanism(s) to use to
ensure privacy friendliness in a software system, but they are necessarily focused on
a point in the design process which follows what is arguably the optimum stage for
the  implementation  of  PbD.  Rather  than focussing  on  the  nature  of  the  privacy-
enhancing  technology  itself,  we  should  instead  focus  on  the  prior  question  of
whether such a technology is necessary in the first place, with the aim of providing
software designers with  an early opportunity to  side-step the issue altogether  by
making their systems inherently privacy-friendly.
On  this  view,  we  might  identify  two  interpretations  of  “by design”.  The  orthodox
interpretation  looks  at  whether  the  given  product  or  service  has  privacy-friendly
83 J.-H. Hoepman,  ‘Privacy Design Strategies’ at  ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection
(Springer,  2014),  p.  1  <http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-55415-5_38>
accessed 1 July 2015.
84 M. Hafiz,  ‘A Collection of Privacy Design Patterns’ at  Proceedings of the 2006 conference on
Pattern languages of programs (ACM, 2006); M. Hafiz, ‘A Pattern Language for Developing
Privacy Enhancing Technologies’ (2013) 43 Software: Practice and Experience 769.
85 ‘Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data’ (fn 8).
86 ‘ISO/IEC 29100:2011 - Information Technology - Security Techniques - Privacy Framework’ (fn
12).
87 Hoepman (fn 84).
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features  which  mitigate  or  remove  what  would  otherwise  be  privacy-unfriendly
behaviour.  Under  the  alternative  perspective,  we  might  consider  the  software
environment within which the product is designed, rather than the actual product per
se. Instead of burdening the output of the design process with the technological and
usability  overheads  that  come  with  some  PETs  and  other  on-the-fly  regulatory
measures,88 we instead aim towards the creation of design environments where the
aims and values of those measures are part of the creative process itself and are
subsequently reflected,  by design and by default  (to quote the heading of Article
23(1) of the draft GDPR), in their output. On this view the concept of “by design”
might therefore be embodied not in a new privacy-enhancing software approach, but
instead in an augmented design process which includes checks to ensure that the
end  product  is  inherently legally  compliant,  without  the  need  for  technological
assessments  at  runtime.  The  development  environment  will  help  the  software
designer to answer the question: is this design privacy-friendly? At an abstract level
this is akin to Cavoukian's third principle of PbD:
“[Privacy]  is  not  bolted  on as  an add-on,  after  the  fact.  The result  is  that
privacy  becomes  an  essential  component  of  the  core  functionality  being
delivered. Privacy is integral to the system, without diminishing functionality.”89
References in the PbD literature to the “early design stage”90 remain too broad; in a
software  system  of  any  complexity  the  design  stage  can  be  so  long  that
considerations of privacy can be de facto  post hoc if they happen late enough. In
order to avoid this and realise our alternative vision of “by design”, there needs to be
a means of identifying early on within that stage itself where there is functionality that
is potentially hostile to user privacy. 
To that end, the method here proposed provides software designers with a tool for
modelling parts of their proposed system which can be audited against boilerplate
models  of  the  law in  order  to  “certify”91 that  they  are  legally  compliant.  As  the
88 On the topic of  privacy-aware software designers implementing effective but user-unfriendly
privacy  systems,  see  A.  Whitten  and  J.D.  Tygar,  ‘Why  Johnny  Can’t  Encrypt:  A Usability
Evaluation of PGP 5.0’ Usenix Security (1999).
89 Cavoukian and others (fn 24).
90 See for example European Commission, ‘A Digital Agenda for Europe’ (fn 17), p. 21.
91 The certification possibilities of the approach are particularly powerful. These are discussed in
further detail below.
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software model is built out and becomes more complex, these sub-model building
blocks can be brought together into a DRM system whose design both enterprises
and users can be confident is privacy-friendly ab initio.
5. Towards a novel solution: introducing the Petri net
Feigenbaum et al suggest that
“[a]  first  step  in  privacy-aware  system  design  is  to  analyze  the  need  for
information, to graph flows among the various system participants, to analyze
how the  information  flow  can  be  minimized,  and  to  design  the  message
formats accordingly.”92
The approach introduced here achieves several of these aims simultaneously, and
amongst  other  things  promotes  the  principle  of  collection  limitation  which  is  an
important tool in any pragmatic technical implementation of privacy protection.93
The  Petri  net  is  a  well-established,  standardised94 formal  modelling  approach
designed to  represent  processes in  terms of  “states”  and “transitions”.  Originally
conceived by Carl Petri in 1962,95 Petri nets have been used in fields as diverse as
banking, nuclear power and web services,96 not to mention for the modelling of legal
systems.97 They are particularly useful in the beginning stages of the design not just
of  software but  of  “systems of  all  kinds in  which  regulated flows of  objects  and
information are of significance.”98 Despite their graphical appearance and apparent
simplicity (they were intentionally designed to  facilitate  an easy understanding of
complex systems99), the flow of processes modelled using a Petri net can be easily
92 Feigenbaum and others (fn 34), p. 91.
93 See ibid., pp. 91–92; Spiekermann and Cranor (fn 42); Gürses, Troncoso and Diaz (fn 22).
94 ‘Systems  and  Software  Engineering.  High-Level  Petri  Nets.  Concepts,  Definitions  and
Graphical Notation’ (ISO/IEC, 2004) Standard 15909-1:2004+A1:2010.
95 C.A. Petri, ‘Kommunikation Mit Automaten’ (PhD, University of Bonn 1962) <http://epub.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/informatik/volltexte/2011/160/> accessed 10 July 2015.
96 ‘Systems  and  Software  Engineering.  High-Level  Petri  Nets.  Concepts,  Definitions  and
Graphical Notation’ (fn 96), p. 1; R. Hamadi and B. Benatallah, ‘A Petri Net-Based Model for
Web Service Composition’ at  Proceedings of  the 14th Australasian Database Conference -
Volume  17  (Australian  Computer  Society,  Inc,  2003);  for  a  comprehensive  list  with
accompanying references see T.  Murata,  ‘Petri  Nets:  Properties,  Analysis  and Applications’
(1989) 77 Proceedings of the IEEE 541, p. 542.
97 J.A.  Meldman,  ‘A  Petri-Net  Representation  of  Civil  Procedure’  (1977)  19  Idea 123;  J.A.
Meldman and A.W. Holt, ‘Petri Nets and Legal Systems’ (1971) 12 Jurimetrics Journal 65.
98 W. Reisig, A Primer in Petri Net Design (Springer, 1992), p. 1.
99 Ibid., p. 2.
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simulated100 and,  crucially,  can  be  formally  (mathematically)  verified.  These
characteristics  mean  they  can  balance  intuitive  comprehension  and  analytical
certainty in a way which other superficially similar modelling approaches, such as
Unified Modelling Language, do not.101
Although Meldman’s work in the 1970s102 appears to be the last time in the literature
that Petri nets were applied to the modelling of legal processes, the advent of PbD
brings with it a renewed impetus to consider approaches which can begin to resolve
the  conceptual  distance  between  legal  regulatory  requirements  and  technical
implementation. The particular characteristics of Petri nets mean they can bridge the
gap  between  high-level  abstract  thinking  about  processes  (what  lawyers  and
managers  might  do)  and  low-level,  detailed  consideration  of  concrete  technical
behaviour (what software designers and developers do). As discussed above, the
singular lack of overlap in expertise between the legal and technical worlds impedes
the kind of collaboration that would lead naturally to the development of approaches
which facilitate legal compliance at the software design stage. Petri nets have the
potential  to  mitigate  this  problem  by  combining  an  intuitive  method  for  process
modelling  that  non-technical  (legal)  experts  can  understand  with  a  precise  and
formalised logic  that  can facilitate  the  concrete  design  decisions which  technical
experts will be required to make in the new world of PbD, particularly in areas such
as  DRM  where  privacy  concerns  are  especially  acute.  Furthermore,  the  formal
proofing characteristics of Petri nets have positive implications for user confidence,
and thus marketability, as they facilitate the stricter transparency and accountability
requirements of the draft GDPR.
5.1 Petri nets: a primer
5.1.1 Primitives: states, transitions and arcs
The  Petri  net  is  a  graphical  representation  of  a  process,  made  up  of  symbols
(“primitives”)  representing  states and  transitions.103 These are  connected by  arcs
100 Using open source tools such as GreatSPN, which was used to draw and validate the models
in this paper. See <http://www.di.unito.it/~amparore/mc4cslta/editor.html> accessed 9 August
2015. For a full list of tools, see the list at fn 120, infra.
101 K. Salimifard and M. Wright,  ‘Petri Net-Based Modelling of Workflow Systems: An Overview’
(2001) 134 European Journal of Operational Research 664, p. 667.
102 Meldman (fn 98).
103 In the literature the term “places” is sometimes used instead of “states”. The latter implies a
status rather than a physical location, however, so seems more appropriate for our purposes.
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(arrows)  which represent  the flow of the process. These three primitives are the
essence of all Petri nets.104 A simple Petri net is shown in Figure 1.105
States are represented by circles, while transitions are represented by a rectangle.106
There  are  several  types  of  Petri  net,  each  with  slightly  different  characteristics
tailored  to  a  particular  class  of  application.  For  our  purposes  we  are  mostly
interested in the “timed” Petri net, a variant which allows transitions to be given a
duration and prioritised such that they fire in a given chronological order. In such a
net the transition symbols can be immediate (filled) or exponential (unfilled), with any
immediate  transitions  capable  of  firing  doing  so  before  their  exponential
counterparts.
Returning to the other primitives, a state containing a marker (a dot) “holds”, which is
to say that that state (or states) represents the current condition of the system within
the range of possible conditions contained within the overall process. Multiple states
can lead to, or from, a single transition, and they can hold simultaneously. Both of
these characteristics are shown in  Figure 2.  At  any given moment the particular
configuration of states is called the net's marking.
104 Note that this is necessarily a very brief overview of Petri nets and their most basic concepts,
as a fuller exposition of the wealth of literature they have generated is outwith the scope of this
paper. For a sample, see Petri's original thesis Petri (fn 97) (German) or Murata (fn 97).
105 These figures are inspired by those in Meldman (fn 99) owing to the clarity of the latter.
106 Or sometimes a square, or a line perpendicular to the arrow.
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Figure 1
Once a transition fires, all states leading to it will cease holding and those which lead
from it will start holding. This is regardless of the number of prior or following states –
preceding markers are exhausted and as many new ones as are required to fulfil the
following states are created. This is demonstrated in Figures 2 and 3.
5.1.2 Inhibitor arcs and arc weighting
A transition will fire when all the states which lead to it hold. An important exception
to this is where the arrow is an inhibitor arc. This flips the logic so that the transition
is fired when the state from which the inhibitor arc flows does not hold. In Figure 4,
for example, this would result in S1 holding. 
The final basic representation is arc weighting, which specifies the minimum number
of markers which an arrow will carry – if the arrow has a weighting of more than one,
then the transition it points to will fire only if the state which precedes it has at least
that number of markers. The weighting is denoted by a number next to the relevant
arrow, as in Figure 5 (where the weighting is 1, no number is shown). In Figure 5,
then, S1 cannot hold because there are insufficient markers to fire T0.
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Figure 2 Figure 3
Figure 4 Figure 5
5.1.3 Competing transitions
Two or  more  transitions  can be  in  competition,  or  conflict,  with  one  another,  as
shown in Figure 6. There, because only one of the states necessary to fire T1 holds,
but both required for T2 hold, the latter will be fired. S5 will then hold, without the
possibility of S4 holding (Figure 7).
Providing a very limited range of primitives in this way means that complex real-
world processes can be reduced to simple logical representations which are suitable
for computational simulation and analysis. Indeed, in complex nets the transitions
themselves can be represented as “sub-nets”, thus mirroring the basic architecture
of  object-oriented  computer  programming  where  discrete  methods  process  input
data and pass their output on to other functions (indeed, abstracting and nesting nets
in this way is sometimes referred to as “object Petri nets”). For example, Meldmann
identifies repeating sub-nets (which he calls “general  events”)  within his complex
Petri net of United States civil procedure, which he abstracts into a single “function”
that can be called upon when required at various points in the overall  net.107 The
detailed model  is  thus transformed from a complex net  containing  many tens of
primitives to a smaller number of abstracted, high-level sub-nets with comparatively
few primitives demonstrating the flow between them.  This process of  abstraction
could theoretically be repeated until  ultimately the legal system is modelled in its
entirety.
107 Meldman (fn 99), p. 142 et seq. For the complete model see ibid., p. 141.
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5.2 Petri nets and PbD
From the perspective  of  PbD the  Petri  net  is  a  powerful  tool.  A newly-proposed
software system, and its constituent parts, can be repeatedly tested according to a
model of the relevant part(s) of data protection law. These high-level tests can free
DRM  software  designers  to  concentrate  on  designing  a  system  that  effectively
protects the rightholder's intellectual property without having to take on the cognitive
load of remembering and applying a complex body of regulatory norms.
From a wider perspective, Petri nets have the benefit  of providing “clarification of
ambiguities and inconsistencies in the natural language descriptions of systems”.108
For example, in considering his Petri model of US civil procedure, Meldman notes
that  a  particular  outcome  which  is  not  readily  intelligible  from  a  reading  of  the
legislative provisions alone “comes right to the surface when attempting to describe
the rules in the Petri-net language.”109 The long-term potential then is not just for the
creation of a tool that passively aids systems designers and developers but also,
through the abstraction and clear presentation of complex legal norms, promotes
consideration  of  those  norms  in  the  technical  environment,  with  concomitantly
positive  implications  for  user  privacy.  By  going  through  the  modelling  process,
designers can gain “a detailed understanding of the relevant processes as well as
stakeholder needs”,110 potentially resulting in the ultimate realisation of PbD aims:
software designers start to internalise and apply the regulatory norms consciously
and naturally, without the external prompting of a tool.
5.2.1 Modelling data protection law
To demonstrate  the Petri  net  in  context,  this  section will  model  part  of  the  data
protection  principles  from  the  provisions  of  the  DPD.  Those  provisions  can  be
thought of essentially as a set of test questions which the controller is expected to
ask herself before engaging in processing, such as “are these data personal?”, “do I
need to seek explicit consent before processing?”, “is there an exception that permits
processing?”, and so on. Each question represents a “gate” which will affect which
question(s) must subsequently be asked, and ultimately whether the processing is
lawful according to the Directive.
108 Meldman and Holt (fn 99), p. 65.
109 Meldman (fn 99), p. 145.
110 Spiekermann and Cranor (fn 42), p. 69.
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Figure 8 shows a Petri (sub-)net which models the DPD Article 8 provision regarding
special (sensitive) categories of data. In practice the initial marking of the sub-net
would be set according to whether the system being assessed processes one of
those special categories of data and whether one of the exceptions applies (these
inputs from other parts of the model are represented by dotted arcs). If sensitive data
is being processed (in the initial marking one of the states in the top-right box holds),
processing_can_continue  cannot  hold  unless  one  of  the  exception  states  in  the
bottom-right box also holds. The presumption here is that  processing_is_legitimate
holds  as  an  output  of  a  previous  test  which  checks  whether  the  processing  is
legitimate pursuant to Article 7.  S1 will  hold by default because transition  T1 fires
automatically (it is an immediate transition and all of its input states currently hold).
Given the initial marking of this sub-net shows one of the special category states
holds (racial_ethnic_origin),  sensitive_data_present will also hold but, because of
the  absence  of  an  exception  state (bottom  right  box)  the  transition
article_8_exception_applies can never  fire,  and  thus  processing_can_continue is
unreachable  and  the  process  is  “deadlocked”.  (Note  the  inhibitor  arc  between
sensitive_data_present and  the  non_sensitive_data transition  –  because  of  its
reversing logic, if the former does not hold because sensitive data is not present then
the  latter  will  fire,  thus  bypassing  the  exception  test  and  moving  straight  to
processing_can_continue.)
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Figure 8
5.2.2 Interlinking software and legal models
This  is  a  simple  example  of  one  small  part  of  the  overall  net,  and  obviously  it
represents  a part  of  the  legal,  rather  than the  software,  process.  But  within  this
approach models of both can interlink. For example, in Figure 9, in order for the
DRM software process to continue from S0 to S4, the legal sub-net must be traversed
successfully,  which  includes  transition  T2.  We can  think  of  that  transition  as an
abstracted version of  the special  categories of data test  represented in  Figure 8
above. As we saw there, that test required input regarding the forms of data which
were to be processed, and the exceptions which applied. This information can be
provided by other parts of the software process, as demonstrated in Figure 9. There
we can imagine a sub-net of the overall software net communicating to the legal sub-
net  (by  means  of  a  state  being  held,  or  not)  whether  one  of  the  categories  of
sensitive  data  is  being  processed,  and  whether  any  exceptions  apply.  The
information so provided allows the assessment contained in the legal sub-net to be
carried out.
A theoretical real-world example will illuminate this concept. The DRM software sub-
net in Figure 9 might represent a piece of functionality which presents a form to the
user which they must complete in order to access the service represented by the
overall software net. One of the optional questions on that form might ask the user to
specify their ethnic origin. The software sub-net will therefore pass this state to the
legal sub-net depending on whether the user entered that piece of information – if
they did, then sensitive information has been gathered, and if not, then it has not
(ceteris paribus, of course). If we then imagine the Figure 9 net within a model of the
wider system, S1 could represent processing_is_legitimate from Figure 8, S3 could be
processing_can_continue, and  input  from  S2 in  the  software  sub-net  becomes
racial_ethnic_origin. 
This is only an abstract and simplified example, of course; in practice the approach
would include states and transitions sufficiently detailed to accurately map the inputs
and outputs of both the legal and software processes.
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5.3 Validating the model
In  software  development  there  are  two  main  approaches  to  validating  an
application's behaviour – static and dynamic analysis. The latter is used on “live”
code, that is code that has been compiled111 and is run in a testing environment
analogous to that of the end user. The former is like a theoretical test run, where
rather  than  emulating  the  software's  performance  in  a  real-world  context  with
plausible test data, instead it is the underlying logic which is evaluated. The strength
of static analysis  is that it  “can be used in the initial  phase of testing to identify
definite program errors such as deadlocks that are guaranteed to occur.”112 Petri nets
are a tool well suited to this aim because
“[they allow] specification  prototypes  to  be  developed to  test  ideas  at  the
earliest and cheapest opportunity. Specifications written in the technique may
be subjected to analysis methods to prove properties about the specifications,
before implementation commences, thus saving on testing and maintenance
time and providing a high level of quality assurance.”113
111 Compilation is the process of turning source code into machine-executable instructions.
112 S.M. Shatz and W.K. Cheng,  ‘A Petri  Net Framework for Automated Static Analysis of  Ada
Tasking Behavior’ (1988) 8 Journal of Systems and Software 343, p. 343.
113 ‘Systems  and  Software  Engineering.  High-Level  Petri  Nets.  Concepts,  Definitions  and
Graphical Notation’ (fn 96), Introduction.
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Figure 9





These  attributes  are  self-evidently  attractive  from a  commercial  perspective  with
respect to complying with PbD in the development of new DRM systems. Shatz and
Cheng demonstrate one method for translating software code into a Petri net than
can be assessed using appropriate software to identify flow problems.114 Although
their examples are concerned with deadlocks in the Ada programming language, the
concepts  are  readily  applicable  across  various  contexts  more  relevant  to  our
purposes,  including  more  common C-based  programming  languages,115 business
process modelling,116 and web services.117
As mentioned above,  a  crucial  aspect  of  the Petri  net  language is  the  ability to
formally (that is, mathematically) prove the “reachability” of the states within the net.
Provided the legal and software systems have been modelled accurately, one can
thus certify that the design of a given system is or is not compliant with a particular
law. Although a full formal proof is outwith the scope of this paper, there follows a
brief discussion which will  give a sense of the mathematical underpinnings of the
approach. 
5.3.1 Formal definition and reachability analysis
Borrowing from Murata's definition,118 a Petri net is a set of 5 elements (P = (S, T, F,
W, M0)) consisting of:
i. S = {S1, S2, S3 …, Sn} (a set of states)
ii. T = {T1, T2, T3, …, Tn} (a set of transitions)
iii. F ⊆ (S x T) ∪ (T x S) (a set of arcs; the flow relation)
iv. W: F → {1, 2, 3, …} (the arc weightings)
v. M0: S → {0, 1, 2, …} (the net's initial marking)
vi. S ∩ T = Ø and S ∪ T ≠ Ø 
114 Shatz and Cheng (fn 113).
115 See B. Lin, ‘Software Synthesis of Process-Based Concurrent Programs’ at Proceedings of the
35th  annual  Design  Automation  Conference (ACM,  1998)  <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?
id=277182> accessed 24 July 2015. Most modern software is written in C or in languages
based on C.
116 S. Hinz, K. Schmidt and C. Stahl, ‘Transforming BPEL to Petri Nets’ in Wil MP van der Aalst and
others (eds) at Business Process Management (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005).
117 Hamadi and Benatallah (fn 97).
118 Murata (fn 98), p. 543.
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The “plain” net with no markers is denoted by N = (S, T, F, W) while a net with a
given initial marking is denoted by (N, M0). Taking this forward we can define the
(already abstracted) net in Figure 9 as follows:
i. S = {S0, S1, S2, S3, S4}
ii. T = {input, output, T2}
iii. F = {(S0, input), (input, S1), (S1, T2), (T2, S3), (S3, output), (output, S4), (S2,
T2)}
iv. W  =  {(S0,  input)→1,  (input,  S1)→1,  (S1,  T2)→1,  (T2,  S3)→1,  (S3,
output)→1, (output, S4)→1, (S2, T2)→1}
v. M0 = {S0 → 1}
In order to analyse the net to discern its behaviour, we can test its “reachability” to
identify whether  a  given state can hold as the process is  stepped through.  This
allows us to test whether a given (sub-)net can be successfully traversed. To assess
reachability first we set out the possible markings of the net by stepping through
them, one by one. The order of each marking's set matches the numbering of the
states, for example {S0, S1, S2, ...}, and 0 or 1 denotes the number of markers in that
state – any number greater than 0 therefore means that the relevant state holds. For
Figure 9 the possible markings are as follows:
M0 = {1, 0, 0, 0, 0}
M1 = {0, 1, 0, 0, 0}
Since there are no markings in which our desired state S4 holds, this process is at a
deadlock and something needs to change for it to continue. If we alter the net to
include an output  marker  in  S2 in  the  software  sub-net,  the  possible  states  look
instead like this:
M0 = {1, 0, 1, 0, 0}
M1 = {0, 1, 1, 0, 0}
M2 = {0, 0, 0, 1, 0}
M3 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 1}
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Under this  initial  marking it  is  thus possible  for  S4 to  hold,  and therefore for  the
software process to continue – it successfully “passes” the test of the legal sub-net. 
Clearly the matrix of markings will be larger when derived from a less abstracted net,
such as that in Figure 8. There, if for example the system processes data relating to
racial or ethnic origin and explicit consent has been obtained (in other words, the
initial  marking  shows  legitimate_processing,  racial_ethnic_origin and
explicit_consent_obtained holding), then where
S = {legitimate_processing, S1, sensitive_data, racial_ethnic_origin, 
political_opinions, religious_philosophical_beliefs, trade_union_membership,
health_or_sex_life, S2, explicit_consent_obtained, 
required_by_employment_law, vital_interests, not_for_profit, 
data_manifestly_public, processing_can_continue} 
we can derive a reachability matrix thus:
M0 = {1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
M1 = {0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
M2 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
M3 = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1}
which shows that processing_can_continue (the final state in marking M3) can hold,
verifying to the software designer that her system is compliant. 
Although the literature on Petri net provability is highly technical (and the introduction
shown here necessarily brief), the analytical methods are well-established and are a
part of numerous software analysis tools which are already available.119 If these were
integrated  into  software  development  environments  the  underlying  mathematical
analysis would not need to be exposed to the software designer, who could instead
focus on modelling and testing their proposed system.
119 For an exhaustive list, see University of Hamburg, ‘Petri Nets World: Petri Nets Tools Database
Quick  Overview’  <http://www.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/TGI/PetriNets/tools/quick.html>
accessed 12 August 2015.
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5.4 Leveraging the model: triaging deadlocks
Returning to Figure 9, if the software net cannot proceed to  S4 because sensitive
data  is  being  gathered  and  no  Article  8(2)  exception  applies,  the  system hits  a
deadlock. Knowing this early on in the DRM development process gives the designer
space and time to consider three options: 
i. Reassess  the  overall  functionality  and  aims  of  the  system  to  determine
whether,  given the  business model  being pursued,  it  would  be feasible  to
achieve the same functionality and commercial outcomes without gathering
those data;
ii. Redesign the relevant parts of the system to incorporate technical measures
which will make the functionality in question regulatorily compliant; or
iii. Change  the  business  model  altogether  if  its  aims  are  found  to  be
fundamentally incompatible with the requirements of the regulation.
The first option gives the designer (and enterprise) an opportunity to assess their
DRM system's proposed behaviour with a view to applying more strictly the collection
and use limitation  principles  of  data  protection.  This  accords  with  both  the  draft
GDPR suggestion of processing minimisation as a potential strategy for achieving
PbD,120 and  with  the  view that  technical  responses  to  data  protection  regulation
should focus first on data minimisation, given the technical difficulty at present of
implementing more sophisticated forms of automated regulatory compliance.121 
The  second  option  will  usually  involve  a  greater  investment  of  development
resources,  but  when  coupled  with  further  rounds  of  modelling  and  testing,  the
incorporation of a PET or privacy design pattern122 at this early stage of the design
process will fulfil Cavoukian's stipulation that “privacy [become] an essential part of
the core functionality being delivered”.123 
The  third  option  will  be  unattractive  to  most  businesses,  particularly  startup
companies or those on the cusp of developing a disruptive new product or service
120 Recital 61.
121 Gürses, Troncoso and Diaz (fn 21).
122 Hafiz, ‘A Collection of Privacy Design Patterns’ (fn 85).
123 Cavoukian and others (fn 25), Principle 3.
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who will  not want creative energy and momentum to go to waste. If  a product is
ultimately unworkable, however, it is clearly preferable to halt its development in the
early stages of the design process rather than later on when further creative and
financial  resources  have  been  invested  in  it  and  the  risk  of  waste  and  loss  is
accordingly far greater.
5.5 Meeting the GDPR's data controller requirements
Apart from the attraction of automating the detection of deadlocks in the interchange
between the software and legal systems, the provability of the proposed approach
also makes it possible to fulfil certain assessment requirements of the GDPR. For
example  Article  22(1)  requires  controllers  to  be  able  to  demonstrate  that  the
processing they carry out is “performed in compliance with this Regulation”, Article
28 creates documentation obligations, and Article 33 requires controllers in certain
cases to perform a “data protection impact assessment”. In each case the modelling
of the system and the results of the reachability analysis can help in meeting these
requirements – formal verification can demonstrate that particular states in the model
are definitively avoided or reached, while the graphical model itself could serve as
documentation of the process being implemented. For the impact assessment, it can
also provide evidence of both the behaviour the system was designed to exhibit, and
the designer’s efforts to assess it for regulatory compliance.
Related to these requirements are the provisions regarding certification. Recital 60
obliges data controllers to “be able to demonstrate the compliance of processing
activities”, while Recital 60(c) refers to “approved certifications”. Article 23(2a) states
that  “[a]n  approved  certification  mechanism...  may  be  used  as  an  element  to
demonstrate compliance with the requirements in paragraphs 1 and 2”. Pursuant to
Article 39(5), appropriate regulatory bodies (perhaps including the GDPR-proposed
European Data  Protection  Board124)  could  develop,  maintain  and make available
legally sound models of the relevant provisions, using their access to in-house legal
expertise and research resources to maintain their accuracy, and perhaps utilising
the formalisation techniques discussed above as a means of representing the norms
in forms sufficiently abstracted for representation as Petri net states and transitions.
124 See  Recital  110.  The  EDPB  is  intended  to  replace  the  Data  Protection  Working  Party,
established under the DPD Art. 29.
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Once  the  legal  model  has  been  created  and  made  publicly  available,  software
designers could “plug in” Petri net models of their proposed designs, thus leveraging
the regulators’ legal expertise, embodied in the model, without the need to attempt to
perform, or commission, an expensive and time-consuming legal assessment. If their
proposed system passes the verified legal model this might satisfy one element (if
not the whole) of  the GDPR’s certification requirements.  This in turn would be a
selling point for the data controller, demonstrating that they are actively promoting
user  privacy rather  than merely  complying  with  the  law,  thus strengthening user
confidence and driving the market towards PbD compliance. If properly publicised,
certifications of this sort would signal that the system in question has been formally
verified as privacy-friendly, thus promoting user confidence on an evidential basis in
a way that initiatives like TRUSTe, which lack such verification, do not. They would
also  go  some  way  to  fulfilling  the  data  protection  principles  of  openness  and
accountability discussed above.125
6. Concluding remarks
Not surprisingly, the draft GDPR's privacy by design requirements are currently a
point of focus for enterprises whose business relies on products and services which
process personal data. They are therefore a priority application for the approach set
out in this paper. But, as will have been evident, the techniques described need not
be limited to data protection law. They are, at least notionally, agnostic with regard to
the legal fields they can model and be used to assess, and thus the approach has
the  potential  to  assist  those  designing  any  software  whose  functionality  has
regulatory implications (which is to say almost all of it). 
One  might  see  therefore  imagine  a  more  holistic  approach  to  implementing
compliance in software systems – large bodies of otherwise untested code can be
validated against complex, fully-realised models of the legal system, to shed some
much-needed regulatory light on what are currently black boxes of functionality that
may unwittingly (or not) be compromising user rights or other fundamental social
values. By involving the regulatory authorities in a way which simultaneously goes to
the heart of the product design but also maintains the freedom to innovate, we retain
the democratic connection between legislative intention and the application of the
125 In the GDPR context, see Art. 5(1)(a) and Recital 30.
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regulation,  without  stifling  the  creative  and  economic  force  of  the  enterprise.
Simultaneously,  the  cultural  shift  that  can  take  place  when  enterprises  are
incentivised  to  consider  regulatory  values  from  the  very  earliest  stages  of  their
design processes (particularly strongly normative values like privacy) can only be
good for perceptions of corporate responsibility and therefore, ultimately, economic
performance.
Returning  to  the  DRM  context,  the  technology  has  skewed  the  commercial
relationship grossly in favour of the rightholder, to a point where the user is merely a
“second-class  participant”.126 Apart  from  its  impact  on  fundamental  rights,  the
commercial  results  have  also  been  disastrous,  as  we  have  seen.  Even  if  the
reputation of DRM is beyond repair, the type of rights protection it was designed to
facilitate  is  necessary,  arguably now more  than  ever.  By adopting  the  approach
described here DRM developers can create new generations of content protection
that balance the often competing interests of rightholders and users.
126 Vora, Reynolds and Dickinson (fn 37).
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